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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-AUTOMOBILE
SEARCH WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE-Michigan v. Long - In the
landmark 1967 decision of Terry v. Ohio,' the Supreme Court
declared that a pat-down search of a criminal suspect made
without probable cause is lawful under the fourth amendment,
provided the police officer conducting the search has a reasona-
ble fear that the suspect is carrying a weapon.2 In Michigan v.
Long,' the Court for the first time addressed whether such a
protective search, in the absence of probable cause, could extend
to an area beyond the person.4 Where an automobile is con-
cerned, the Court has now ruled strongly in favor of the police,
granting them authority to search the passenger compartment,
including concealed areas, whenever they reasonably fear weap-
ons are in the car.5 Beyond this extension of already significant
police dominance over automobiles, 6 the Long decision has im-
portant implications for future searches of other areas, such as
the home.
The Supreme Court has declared that under the fourth
amendment7 warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, "sub-
ject to only a few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions."8 "Whenever practicable," police must obtain advance
judicial approval for a search by obtaining a warrant. In Terry,
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id. at 27.
3. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
4. Id. at 1034.
5. Id. at 1049.
6. Beginning with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), which permitted the
warrantless search of a car where police had probable cause to believe it contained con-
traband, the Supreme Court has consistently regarded the automobile as an exceptional
area enjoying generally less protection under the fourth amendment. See infra notes 27-
41 and accompanying text.
7. The fourth amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 at 20. (The Court stated that they were not retreating
from "holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance approval
through the warrant procedure").
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however, the Court recognized that there are times when effec-
tive police work requires affirmative acts of investigation under
circumstances which fall outside the warrant requirement." In
such cases, the police conduct will be measured by the fourth
amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and not by the more rigid warrant clause."
In Terry, the suspicions of a police detective with 30 years
experience in patrolling downtown Cleveland2 were aroused by
the actions of two men who appeared to be "casing" a store and
planning a "stick-up."' 3 The detective testified that after he ob-
served the men making repeated trips to the store window to
peer inside and then walking away to confer with a third man,
he considered it his duty to investigate further and confront the
suspects.'4 The Court agreed that it would have been "poor po-
lice work" to have failed to inquire into their suspicious behav-
ior.'5 When the detective approached the three men and asked
what they were doing, he received a mumbled, inarticulate re-
sponse.16 Fearing that they were armed, he patted down all three
men by running his hands over their outer clothing.17 On two of
the suspects he felt something hard underneath the clothing,
and in each case he reached inside the garments and recovered
illegally possessed handguns.' 8
The Court recognized that at the time the detective stopped
and questioned the three suspects in Terry, he did not have
probable cause to arrest them for any crime.19 Yet the stop, and
the subsequent pat-down search and seizure of the weapons,
were held to be reasonable under the fourth amendment.20 The
Court's rationale was that a police officer is entitled to protect
himself during potentially dangerous encounters with criminal
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 23.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Id. at 6-7.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 24. The trial court found that it "would be stretching the facts beyond
reasonable comprehension" to conclude the officer had probable cause to arrest the men.
Id. at 7-8.
20. Id. at 30.
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suspects.2 Such a pat-down search of the person of a suspect is
permissible when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is armed with a weapon.2
While Terry had not been extended beyond the pat-down
search of the person of a suspect, the Court, in Chimel v. Cali-
fornia,25 granted police clear authority to search the immediate
area surrounding a suspect once he is actually under arrest.2
4
Under this "search incident to arrest" principle, as narrowly
prescribed in Chimel, the search of the person of the arrestee,
and the immediate area within his control, is considered rea-
sonable for the protection of the police, who may be injured
should the arrestee grab a nearby weapon.2 5 The rationale for
the Chimel decision would prove to have great significance for
the Court twelve years later in Long.26
Several other cases laid important groundwork for the deci-
sion in Long. Beginning with Carroll v. United States,27 the
21. Id. at 23-24. Said the Court:
Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unneces-
sary risks in the performance of their duties. American criminals have a long
tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforce-
ment officers are killed in the line of duty ....
In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforce-
ment officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in
situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is
justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investi-
gating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others, it
would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon
and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
Id.
22. Id.
23. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
24. Id. at 763. In Chimel, police officers obtained a warrant for Chimel's arrest for
burglary and, with permission of the defendant's wife, entered Chimel's home and waited
for him to return from work. When he arrived home, he was handed the warrant and
informed that he was under arrest. The police, who had no search warrant, asked for
permission to look around the house, which Chimel denied. The police searched the en-
tire house anyway, seizing from several locations various items that may have come from
the burglary. Id. at 753-54. The evidence seized was ultimately suppressed by the Su-
preme Court. Id. at 768.
25. Id. at 763. In addition to concern for the safety of the officers, the Court cited
another reason for allowing police to search areas within reach of a defendant incident to
his arrest: that the arrestee might use the opportunity to reach and destroy valuable
evidence. Id.
26. 463 U.S. at 1049 n.14.
27. 267 U.S. 132. See supra note 6.
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Court had said that the automobile will not be as readily
shielded from police scrutiny by the fourth amendment as other
constitutionally protected areas such as the home.28 The ration-
ale, said the Court, is that an automobile, and any contraband
inside it, can easily and quickly be moved to another locale while
police attempt to comply with the time-consuming process of
obtaining a search warrant.2 9 Carroll, therefore, permits the war-
rantless search of a car for contraband once the police establish
probable cause. 0
In Katz v. United States,31 the Court said that the fourth
amendment "protects people, not places,"32 and that whether a
warrantless search is proper does not depend on "the presence
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure,""
but rather upon the reasonableness of the person's expectation
of privacy. 4 Constitutional respect for that expectation of pri-
vacy, said the Court in subsequent decisions, is greatly dimin-
ished once the person steps into an automobile or conceals arti-
cles inside it." Said the Court in Cardwell v. Lewis:38
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation and it seldom
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scru-
tiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occu-
pants and its contents are in plain view. 7
Despite this lesser expectation of privacy, the Court had yet
28. "At least since Carroll v. United States. . .the Court has recognized a distinc-
tion between the warrantless search and seizure of automobiles or other movable vehi-
cles, on the one hand, and the search of a home or office, on the other. Generally, less
stringent warrant requirements have been applied to vehicles." Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 589-90 (1974).
29. 267 U.S. at 153.
30. Id. at 155-56.
31. 389 U.S. 347.
32. Id. at 351.
33. Id. at 353.
34. Id. at 351-53.
35. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970); also, "The search of an automo-
bile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the
search of one's person or of a building." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
36. 417 U.S. 583.
37. Id. at 590.
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to address whether Terry applied to a search of an automobile
for weapons. Yet the Court proceeded to significantly expand
police dominance over the automobile in post-Terry decisions.
For example, the Court subsequently held that: a police officer is
justified in reaching inside a parked car and conducting a Terry
frisk and seizure of a weapon from the waistband of the seated
driver; 8 police are empowered to order suspects out of a car to
conduct a Terry search of their persons;s° when a car occupant is
arrested, the search-incident rule allows police to examine the
entire passenger compartment and any containers therein with-
out a warrant;' 0 and when police have probable cause to believe
a vehicle contains contraband, they may conduct a warrantless
search of every part of the auto and all containers therein that
might reasonably conceal the contraband.'1
38. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
39. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
40. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). But where a car occupant is arrested,
and contraband is concealed in the trunk, whether police can search without a warrant is
dependent on the manner in which the contraband is packaged or concealed. Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981). Justice Powell's concurring opinion, which was control-
ling, stated this test:
[Police are required] to obtain a warrant to search the contents of a
container only when the container is one that generally serves as a repository for
personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting a reasonable
expectation that the contents will not be open to public scrutiny.
Id. at 432.
When confronted with the claim that police should have obtained a warrant
before searching an ambiguous container, a court should conduct a hearing to
determine whether the defendant had manifested a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of the container. Relevant to such an inquiry should be
the size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the context within which
it is discovered, and whether the possessor had taken some significant precau-
tion, such as locking, securely sealing or binding the container, that indicates a
desire to prevent the contents from being displayed .... A prudent officer will
err on the side of respecting ambiguous assertions of privacy ....
Id. at 434 n.3.
41. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); consider also Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730 (1983), where the Court held that the plain-view doctrine allows for the war-
rantless seizure of a suspicious item in an auto when a police officer has prior, justifiable
access to the automobile under the fourth amendment.
While the automobile does not enjoy as complete protection from warrantless
searches as other areas, such as the home, the Court has prescribed some significant
limits for the police. For example: the warrantless search of a car in a driveway is not
justified as a search incident to an arrest which took place in the nearby house. Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); the warrantless search of an automobile by the
U.S. Border Patrol twenty-five miles north of the Mexican border, made without proba-
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Michigan v. Long also concerned an automobile search.
Deputies Howell and Lewis of the Barry County Sheriff's De-
partment were on routine patrol shortly after midnight on Au-
gust 25, 1977, when they observed a vehicle pass them traveling
in the opposite direction at a speed they measured with a radar
device at seventy-one miles per hour, sixteen miles per hour over
the limit.42 The deputies turned their patrol car around to pur-
sue the speeding vehicle. 43 They watched the car turn down a
side road and swerve, and when they came upon the car, it was
stopped in a ditch off to the side, with its rear end protruding
onto the roadway.'4
As the deputies got out of their patrol car and approached
the vehicle, the defendant, Long, who was the driver and sole
occupant, also exited his car and walked toward the deputies,
meeting them at the trunk area of his car.45 The defendant left
the driver's door open and the dome light inside the passenger
compartment on.46 Deputy Howell requested that Long produce
his driver's license, but Long did not respond. 7 Howell made a
second request, and Long, still without speaking, handed the
deputy his license.48 Howell next asked for proof of registration
and insurance for the vehicle, again receiving no response from
Long.'9 When Howell asked a second time, the defendant began
walking toward his open car door.50 At this point, Deputy
Howell concluded that Long "appeared to be under the influ-
ence of something. '51
ble cause or consent and solely because the occupant was a Mexican national, is uncon-
stitutional. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266; the stopping of an automo-
bile by police for a "routine" traffic check is unreasonable under the fourth amendment
absent at least some articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is involved in a
crime or a traffic infraction. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
42. People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. 338, 341, 288 N.W.2d 629, 630 (1979).
43. People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 468, 320 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1982).
44. Id. at 468, 320 N.W.2d at 868.
45. People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. at 341, 288 N.W.2d at 630.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. People v. Long, 413 Mich. at 469, 320 N.W.2d at 868.
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The deputies followed the defendant toward the open
door, '52 and as they approached, Howell observed a "large, fold-
ing knife" on the front floor of the vehicle.53 Howell ordered the
defendant to halt and immediately conducted a pat-down search
of Long while his partner retrieved the knife from the auto." No
weapons were found on the defendant's person.55 Deputy Howell
then shined his flashlight into the front seat of defendant's car
for the purpose of "looking for another weapon,"56 at which
point he noticed what appeared to be a leather article protrud-
ing from beneath the folded-down armrest between the front
seats.57 The deputy reached inside the auto, lifted the armrest,
and recovered an open leather pouch that contained a small
plastic bag filled with marijuana.58 Howell then placed the de-
fendant under arrest for possession of marijuana."
Defendant Long contested the validity of the search as an
unacceptable extension of the Terry doctrine. Terry, he argued,
was never meant to be extended beyond the frisk of the per-
son.60 The trial court6' and the Michigan Court of Appeals62 dis-
agreed. Neither court had any difficulty accepting the Terry doc-
trine as the basis for Deputy Howell's search of the front seat.63
52. Id.
53. People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. at 341-342, 288 N.W.2d at 630. The knife, a
Browning brand folding knife with a four-inch blade, was not illegal, and defendant Long
was never charged with any violation in connection with its possession. 413 Mich. at 469
n.1, 320 N.W.2d at 868 n.1.
54. People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. at 342, 288 N.W.2d at 630.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
61. People v. Long, No. 78-100-FY, slip op., (Mich. Circ. Ct., Barry Co., Oct. 5, 1978).
62. People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. 338, 288 N.W.2d 629.
63. In the District Court's ruling, following the preliminary hearing, to admit the ma-
rijuana seized from the front seat, Judge Hansen relied exclusively on the Terry
doctrine:
Without any explanation, the Defendant started walking toward the open door
of his vehicle. The deputies followed and it was at this point that they saw the
knife on the floor. The Defendant was then frisked which was consistent with
Terry v. Ohio .... After the knife was confiscated and before allowing the De-
fendant back into the interior of the car to get the registration, the deputies
conducted the search which produced the pouch. After a review of the facts in-
volved in this search, it is the Opinion of the Court that the deputies acted rea-
sonable [sic] in conducting a search of the vehicle.
People v. Long, File no. A-506-77, slip op. at 52 (Mich. Dist. Ct., Barry Co., Dec. 28,
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The court of appeals called the facts surrounding the car stop
and the demeanor of the defendant "ominous" for the officers
and sufficient to justify their limited search of the passenger
compartment to protect themselves from any more weapons.8 "
The court of appeals implied that a full search of the interior of
the car might have been unlawful, but said the actual "carefully
circumscribed intrusion" by the deputies was proper under
Terry because the defendant was about to re-enter the car.e5
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the lower courts,
limiting Terry to a pat-down search of the person of a suspect,
and refusing to extend Terry to a search of the interior of an
automobile. 60 The court further reasoned that Terry could not
be invoked because the defendant posed no threat to the depu-
ties, as he possessed no weapons, was under their complete con-
trol, and was away from his car and out of reach of any potential
weapons inside it."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari6 to consider whether
a police officer has the authority to conduct a protective search
of the passenger compartment of an automobile during a lawful
investigatory stop of the occupant.6 9 Jurisdiction was based
1977). The Michigan Court of Appeals also addressed Terry directly:
The salient question presented for our resolution is whether . . . Deputy
Howell's precautionary lifting of the frontseat armrest prior to allowing [the]
defendant to re-enter his automobile was constitutionally valid as a protective
search under the Terry doctrine. We answer this question in the affirmative
People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. at 344, 288 N.W.2d at 631.
64. Id. at 345, 288 N.W.2d at 631-32.
65. 94 Mich. App. at 345, 288 N.W.2d at 632.
66. People v. Long, 413 Mich. at 471, 320 N.W.2d at 869.
67. Id. Said the court:
Any weapon which might have been hidden in the car would have been out of
the reach of the defendant and thus not a danger to the deputies. Therefore, the
sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the police officers and others
nearby, cannot justify the search in this case.
Id.
68. Michigan v. Long, 459 U.S. 904 (1982).
69. 463 U.S. at 1037. A second issue, on which the Court remanded without deciding,
was whether a subsequent inventory search of Long's car was proper under the fourth
amendment. The inventory search revealed more than 70 pounds of marijuana in the
trunk. People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. at 343, 288 N.W.2d at 631.
The Supreme Court said it would not consider whether the inventory search was
valid because Michigan's highest court had not addressed the issue. 463 U.S. at 1053.
The Michigan Supreme Court had ruled that the search of the passenger compartment
by Deputy Howell was prohibited by the fourth amendment, and that the inventory
1985] COMMENTS
upon the heavy reliance the Michigan Supreme Court placed on
federal law in its decision. 0
The arguments before the Court went directly to the appli-
cability of Terry. Petitioner argued that the rationale of the
Terry decision was to provide reasonable protection for police
officers, 7' and that while Terry applied to the frisk of a person,
search of the trunk was therefore unjustified as the "fruit" of illegal police action. People
v. Long, 413 Mich. at 473, 320 N.W.2d at 870. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the
search of the front seat proper, and remanded the question of the inventory search, 463
U.S. at 1053, instructing the Michigan court to determine its validity under South Da-
kota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
The test of admissibility in Opperman is whether the inventory is conducted pursu-
ant to standard police procedure, where the owner is not available to claim the car or
cannot be determined. Id. at 375. The inventory can never be used as a pretext to search
where a warrantless intrusion by police is otherwise unjustified. Id. at 376.
70. 463 U.S. at 1040-44. The question of jurisdiction stirred a vigorous debate among
the justices. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, appeared to set a new "plain-
statement" standard whereby the Court would assume that any matters brought before
it were decided by the lower state courts using primarily federal law, therefore automati-
cally subjecting them to potential Supreme Court review. To avoid such a result, Justice
O'Connor wrote, the state's highest courts must clearly indicate the independent state
law grounds for a decision.
If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the
precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain
statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only
for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the
court has reached. . . . If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly
that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.
Id. at 1041.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the Court's emerging rule on jurisdiction has
lead to a "docket swollen with requests by States to reverse judgments that their courts
have rendered in favor of their citizens." Id. at 1070. The Court, said Stevens, should be
more concerned with those instances where a federal right has been denied a citizen, not
where a state has merely lost a criminal case.
In this case the State of Michigan has arrested one of its citizens and the
Michigan Supreme Court has decided to turn him loose. The respondent is a
United States citizen as well as a Michigan citizen, but since there is no claim
that he has been mistreated by the State of Michigan, the final outcome of the
state processes offended no federal interest whatever. Michigan simply provided
greater protection to one of its citizens than some other state might provide or,
indeed, than this Court might require throughout the country.
I believe that in reviewing the decisions of state courts, the primary role of
this Court is to make sure that persons who seek to vindicate federal rights have
been fairly heard.
Id. at 1068. Justice Blackmun concurred in the validity of the search in Long, but ob-
jected to the majority's "fashioning [of) a new presumption of jurisdiction." Id. at 1054.
71. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032.
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the Court left open for future case development what additional
areas could also be "frisked. '72 Michigan v. Long, argued the pe-
titioner, was just such a case for the kind of extension of-the
Terry doctrine the Court had envisioned.7 Furthermore, said
the petitioner, the armrest frisk was less intrusive for the re-
spondent than a frisk of his person.7 4 Also, Adams v. Williams7"
and Pennsylvania v. Mimms 7 6 clearly indicated that where cars
are concerned, the Court considers police safety paramount and
will allow Terry-like intrusions as reasonable to reveal to the of-
ficers the dangers hidden in a car.7
Finally, petitioner argued that the Michigan Supreme Court
incorrectly relied on Canal Zone v. Bendera7 8 which failed to ad-
dress the larger question of what happens when a suspect is al-
lowed to return to his car, which may have weapons inside, after
police have concluded a lawful stop but are still in the vicinity
and vulnerable. 9
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 7.
75. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
77. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032.
78. Government of Canal Zone v. Bender, 573 F.2d 1329 (1978). This case involved a
similar car stop in which an officer searched the passenger compartment and found mari-
juana while the occupants stood outside and away from the car. Id. at 1330. The defen-
dants were convicted by the United States District Court for the Canal Zone, but the
Fifth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the officer's search was not proper under
Terry. Id. at 1332. The court reasoned that if the officer was truly concerned for his
safety, he would have frisked the person of each of the occupants for weapons first rather
than immediately searching the car. Id. The court also reasoned that since the occupants
were standing away from the car and being watched by another policeman, any weapons
inside the car were out of reach and posed no danger to the police. Id.
The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that Canal Zone v. Bender was a "similar
case" and adopted its reasoning in deciding People v. Long. 413 Mich. at 472 & n.7, 320
N.W.2d at 869 & n.7.
79. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032. Petitioner distin-
guishes Canal Zone v. Bender as follows:
However, Canal Zone ignores the danger to investigating officers where no arrest
is made but the investigation is ongoing and one weapon was already seen and
seized, and the defendant may be allowed to re-enter his vehicle to obtain fur-
ther identification. In this short span of time, under these circumstances, the
deputy here [in Long] reasonably frisked the front armrest of defendant's car.
Other state and federal cases, dealing with automobile frisks where the sus-
pect[s] were outside the car, would uphold the armrest search.
Id. at 8.
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In addressing the applicability of Terry,80 respondent of-
fered two arguments echoing the Michigan Supreme Court's
analysis of the case.81 First, respondent argued for a narrow
reading of Terry, stating that the doctrine only applied to the
pat-down search of the person of a criminal suspect and was
never meant to be applied to searches of property such as a
car.82 Second, respondent argued that the basis for a Terry
search never existed because he at no time presented a danger to
the deputies.83 Two amici briefs, both in support of petitioner,
were also filed with the Court. 84
80. Brief for Respondent at 6-9, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032.
81. Brief for Respondent at 7-8.
82. Id. at 6-7.
83. Id. at 7. Respondent argues that Deputies Howell and Lewis were unable in their
testimony to point to any "particular facts" from which they could infer that Long was
actually a threat to their safety:
[The deputies] never testified that they believed [Long] was armed or danger-
ous. He was cooperative at all times. He was never suspected of anything more
serious than a traffic offense. The folding knife which prompted the initial pat-
down was not illegal .... [One deputy] admitted that Long had given the dep-
uties no reason to draw their weapons or to take him to the patrol car. The pat-
down search of Long showed that he was not armed ....
Id.
The defendant, at the time of the search of the car, was outside it being detained
by one of the deputies, who would not have permitted him to get into the car
while he was watching. Although the deputies claimed that their search was for
weapons, they ignored screwdrivers, hammers and other legal but potentially
dangerous objects [on the floor of the car].
Id.
84. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner, Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032; and Brief of Amici Curiae, Gulf & Great Plains Legal Foundation of
America, joined by Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., In Support of Peti-
tioner, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (hereinafter cited as Law Enforcement Brief).
The Department of Justice argued that the case provided the Court with a unique
opportunity to guide police officers by creating a simple, workable rule allowing the
search of a car when the police have reasonable suspicion that weapons are inside. Brief
for United States at 9-10. Citing the rule established for search of a car incident to arrest
in New York v. Belton, see supra note 40 and accompanying text, the Department of
Justice reasoned that such a solution is a "practical alternative" and "far less intrusive"
than the current status of the law, where a police officer may feel pressure to make an
arrest in order to justify a search. Id. at 10. A limited search in these circumstances
might actually avoid arrests. Id.
The Law Enforcement Brief also maintained that a police officer might feel forced,
in discretionary situations, to make full-scale arrests because of the unavailability of a
less intrusive measure such as the limited search of the passenger compartment. Law
Enforcement Brief at 3-4, 14-15. The effect of the Michigan Supreme Court's decisions,
said the Law Enforcement Brief, is that a police officer must physically block a suspect
from returning to his car rather than neutralize the perceived danger inside the car. Id.
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The Supreme Court's majority opinion, written by Justice
O'Connor, reversed Michigan's highest court and upheld Deputy
Howell's search of the passenger compartment of Long's car.85 In
so doing, the Court for the first time applied the principles of
Terry to an area search.8a Justice O'Connor reasoned that Terry
searches were never meant to be restricted solely to the person
of a suspect,87 but are permitted where reasonable to protect po-
lice officers in investigatory stops where they lack probable cause
to arrest.8 8 Said the Court:
Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent
pat-down of a person, we were careful to note that "[w]e
need not develop at length in this case, however, the limi-
tations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a pro-
tective search and seizure for weapons. These limitations
will have to be developed in the concrete factual circum-
stances of individual cases." 89
So, concluded Justice O'Connor, "[clontrary to Long's view,
Terry need not be read as restricting the preventive search to
the person of the detained suspect."' 0
The majority further stated that the safety of police officers
in investigatory stops is a paramount concern of the Court and
has been, in several post-Terry decisions, sufficient ground for
permitting warrantless searches.91 Pennsylvania v. Mimms9" and
Adams v. Williams" are indicative, said the Court, of the inher-
ent danger for police in vehicle stops." Also, Chimel v. Califor-
nia9 and New York v. Belton," although they deal with
searches incident to arrest, are examples of the Court's reliance
on the concern underlying Terry, that the area immediately sur-
at 3. Clearly, searching the car is a lesser intrusion. Id.
85. 463 U.S. at 1049.
86. Id. at 1046-49.
87. Id. at 1047.
88. Id. at 1047-48.
89. Id. at 1047.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1047-49.
92. 434 U.S. 106.
93. 407 U.S. 143.
94. 463 U.S. at 1047-48 & n.13.
95. 395 U.S. 752.
96. 453 U.S. 454.
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rounding a suspect/arrestee is potentially fraught with danger
for the investigating policeman.9
Whether the search is incident to arrest, as in Chimel or
Belton, or during a lawful investigatory stop, as in Terry or
Long, the danger that a suspect may reach for a hidden weapon
is the same, and therefore the permissible scope of the police
search should be the same.98 Said the majority:
If a suspect is "dangerous," he is no less dangerous sim-
ply because he is not arrested. If, while conducting a le-
gitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile,
the officer should, as here, discover contraband other
than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the
contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require
its suppression in such circumstances.99
In the instant case, said the majority, Deputies Howell and
Lewis acted reasonably in searching Long's car for more weap-
ons as a preventive step before allowing him to re-enter his vehi-
cle.' 00 In conducting this search, the deputies were entitled to
seize any contraband they discovered.' 0 ' The Court reached this
conclusion by applying the "balancing test" of Terry.10 2 The in-
dividual's interest in freedom of movement must be weighed
against the policeman's interest in crime detection and self-pro-
tection.103 Allowing the search in Long, concluded Justice
O'Connor, is a proper extension of the Terry doctrine:
[T]he balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor
of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the
passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as
97. 463 U.S. at 1049 n.14. Said the Court:
What we borrow now from Chimel v. California and New York v. Belton is
merely the recognition that part of the reason to allow area searches incident to
an arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be armed, may be able to
gain access to weapons to injure officers or others nearby, or otherwise to hinder
legitimate police activity. This recognition applies as well in the Terry context.
Id. at 1050.
98. Id. at 1049-50 & n.14.
99. Id. at1050.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 392 U.S. at 21.
103. 463 U.S. at 1046-47.
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they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable be-
lief that the suspect is potentially dangerous. 10'
Justice O'Connor further reasoned that the Michigan Su-
preme Court's majority view that Long was not a potential
threat to the deputies 0 5 was "mistaken" in lieu of the facts of
this particular investigatory stop. 06 Long was still a threat, she
stated, because he could have broken away from the deputies
and retrieved a weapon from his car,'0 7 or, if not placed under
arrest at the conclusion of the investigation, he could have re-
trieved a weapon when he re-entered his car. 0 8
Citing the analysis of Terry,"0 9 the majority stated that
while a police officer is conducting a proper investigatory stop,
he is at "close range" to a suspect and particularly vulnerable
and should not be burdened with having to make snap decisions
on how to avoid a Terry search and yet protect himself." "In
such circumstances," concluded the majority, "we have not re-
quired that officers adopt alternative means to ensure their
safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry
encounter.""'
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined in dis-
senting on fourth amendment grounds," 2 repeated two of the ar-
guments of the Michigan Supreme Court" 3 and added several of
104. Id. at 1051.
105. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
106. 463 U.S. at 1051.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1052.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1052 & n.16. In footnote 16, the majority makes an important distinction
between a search for weapons, which is permissible under Terry, and a search for other
evidence or contraband, which is not. Where a police officer confronts a suspect, he is not
permitted to pat down that person on the reasonable suspicion that the suspect is carry-
ing contraband, but only on the suspicion that the person is carrying a weapon. Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Furthermore, when an officer pats down outer clothing
and feels an object that is clearly not a weapon, he cannot reach inside the clothing and
recover the item. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). Claiming that the dissent misun-
derstands this distinction, the majority states, "Justice Brennan quotes at length from
Sibron, but fails to recognize that the search in that case was a search for narcotics, and
not a search for weapons." Id. at 1053 n.16.
112. See supra note 70 for discussion of Justice Stevens' dissent, which addressed
solely what he perceived to be a lack of jurisdiction to hear Michigan v. Long.
113. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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his own. In support of the state court, Brennan argued, first,
that Terry was intended to apply only to the search of the per-
son of a suspect and never to an area of property,11 and second,
that Terry could not be invoked in Long's case in any event be-
cause Long never posed a threat to the deputies." 5
The heart of Justice Brennan's dissent is his effort to distin-
guish the search-incident rule, as applied in Chimel"6 and Bel-
ton,"1 7 from any merger with the Terry doctrine."' Said Bren-
nan: "The critical distinction between this case [Long] and
Terry on the one hand, and Chimel and Belton on the other, is
that the latter two cases arose within the context of lawful cus-
todial arrests supported by probable cause."" 9 The majority's
claim that the rationale for Chimel and Belton should apply to
Long and Terry is fundamentally inconsistent, said Brennan,
since one kind of search is based on probable cause while the
other is not.120 The majority, said Brennan, "deliberately ig-
nores" this distinction."'
Justice Brennan further reasoned that the intrusion into
Long's car was precisely the kind of intrusion associated with a
full-scale arrest.' 22 The effect of Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion, said Brennan, is that it creates an exception to the
fourth amendment that is so broad as to swallow the entire pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches as it relates to automo-
biles. "' The "balancing test," said Brennan, is a failure and a
"threat" to the fourth amendment.124 He concluded: "There is
no reason in this case why the officers could not have pursued
less intrusive, but equally effective, means of insuring their
114. 463 U.S. at 1056.
115. Id. at 1061-62. Justice Brennan stated that based on the fact that Long was
apparently drunk and could not even drive the car properly, having steered it into a
ditch, it "requires imagination" to conclude that he posed a threat to two policemen. Id.
at 1062.
116. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
118. 463 U.S. at 1057-60.
119. Id. at 1057.
120. Id. at 1059.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1063.
123. Id. at 1064.
124. Id. at 1063.
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safety."1215 As an example, he suggested that the deputies should
have asked Long where his registration was, and once told of a
specific location within the car, looked only in that area and re-
trieved it. 2
The majority's decision to uphold Deputy Howell's armrest
search is a reasonable solution given the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of Michigan v. Long. Each of the alternatives facing
the deputies as Long stood beside them outside the car posed
problems. If they allowed Long to re-enter the car himself to get
the registration, the officers would have unnecessarily exposed
themselves to added risk. 27 Justice Brennan's solution, that of
asking Long where the registration was located, 28 had already
been tried and Long had not answered.2 9 The facts indicate that
another alternative for the deputies, given Long's erratic driving
and unstable demeanor, was to arrest Long for driving while in-
toxicated, thus automatically permitting a passenger compart-
ment search as incident to arrest under Belton.130 Nothing in the
record, however, indicates that the deputies were willing to take
such a drastic step so early in their investigatory stop.'
The solution chosen by the deputies and upheld by the
Court was a limited search of the auto based on a reasonable
fear that more weapons were inside. Accepting the majority's
opinion that Terry was never meant to be strictly limited to the
frisk of the person but could be expanded to other areas in fu-
ture cases,3 2 Long is a particularly appropriate situation in
which to extend the Terry rule. The automobile has the unusual
125. Id. at 1065.
126. Id. at 1065 n.7. Note that this solution conveniently ignores the facts in Long.
The deputies asked Long repeated questions and received no response. See supra text
accompanying notes 47-50.
127. 463 U.S. at 1051-52. Note that even Justice Brennan, in dissenting, did not sug-
gest that the deputies actually allow Long to go back into the car. Brennan implicitly
acknowledged the unreasonable risk that would entail. Id. at 1065 n.7.
128. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
130. 463 U.S. at 1035 n.1, which includes the majority's consideration of this hypo-
thetical. See supra note 84 for discussion of two amici briefs, supporting petitioner,
which also discussed arresting Long for intoxication, thereby permitting the deputies to
search his car.
131. Deputy Howell stated that he had not thought to arrest Long at this point, but
rather was "detaining" the defendant under his police authority to make investigatory
traffic stops. Joint Appendix at 30a-31a, People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866.
132. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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status of being less protected under the fourth amendment than
other areas.133 Given this status, and the Court's concern with
police safety, 4 the Terry doctrine is properly extended here to
include protective searches of automobiles.
Yet the Court in Long makes no effort to draw the line for
searches without probable cause at automobiles. In footnotes
14'1" and 16,136 the Court refers to future "area searches" by po-
lice without considering whether the "areas" are limited solely
to the passenger compartment of automobiles. The majority de-
cision gives no guidance as to what additional areas of property
a police officer may search for his protection despite a lack of
probable cause.
If a similar level of reasonable suspicion developed while an
officer was properly in the home of a criminal suspect, what
would be the Court's decision? Suppose a policeman is properly
admitted to the home of Long, perhaps to aid his father in a
sudden heart attack. While in the house, the officer realizes that
Long bears a remarkable resemblance to the armed-robbery sus-
pect whose picture is on a wanted poster in the precinct. Al-
though he is not certain Long is the wanted man, the officer does
have a very legitimate, reasonable suspicion, and suddenly fears
that Long is either armed, or has a weapon hidden nearby in the
living room. Are these the proper circumstances for another
"area search"? What if the officer, with the same suspicions, en-
counters Long on his front lawn, ten feet from an open door to
his house? Can the officer rush inside and conduct an area
search before Long reaches a weapon?
The majority decision in Long opens a Pandora's Box of fu-
ture search-and-seizure cases. Allowing Terry to apply to auto-
mobiles is an action grounded in the decisions concerning the
car's unusual status under the fourth amendment.1 3 7 By deliber-
ately refusing to limit Long to automobiles, the Court has sig-
133. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
134. 463 U.S. at 1046-49.
135. Id. at 1049 n.14. Without confining the rule to automobiles, the Court said:
"[W]e require that officers who conduct area searches during investigative detentions
must do so only when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry." Id. at 1050.
136. Id. at 1052 n.16. A second time, without confining the rule to automobiles, the
Court stated: "To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons, the
officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially dangerous." Id.
137. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
19851
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
nailed to the police that they have broad discretionary power to
conduct "area searches" without probable cause.
The Court will be faced with a tougher, more direct chal-
lenge to the fourth amendment when such a search, this time of
a home, is inevitably brought before it on appeal. Yet the same
line of decisions that articulated the lesser expectation of pri-
vacy in a car"' will support the contrasting argument that a
home or office is still shielded by the fourth amendment. The
doctrine enunciated in Long provides an important tool for po-
lice when stopping cars, but reason dictates that, ultimately,
Long also works to retain the vitality of the home as an area
inviolate to a reasonable-suspicion search.
Daniel Oates
138. Id.
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